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Abstract There is an increasing body of evidence that the
intensity in which alcohol is drunk is of greater concern
than the frequency or overall quantity consumed. This
paper provides an extensive analysis of the demand for
alcohol as measured by total quantity, frequency, and
intensity. A unique large sample of cross-sectional data
from Sweden 2004–2011 allows reduced-form alcohol
demand equations to be estimated for beer, wine, and
spirits, split by alcohol drinking pattern (average vs. binge
drinkers) and gender. Results find a negative beer excise
rate effect for participation and frequency, and positive
effect for intensity. The effect was stronger for binge
drinkers. Generally, the results also show a positive
socioeconomic (income and education) gradient in fre-
quency demand and a negative gradient in the intensity
demand. Female wine drinkers show a positive socioeco-
nomic gradient in both frequency and intensity. The find-
ings highlight the complexity of this policy space. Tax
increases appear to reduce frequency but raise intensity
consumed. The more educated and higher earners drink
more in total, but less intensely when they do and this is
likely to explain in part why poor health is concentrated
amongst lower socioeconomic status individuals.
Keywords Alcohol  Demand  Drinking pattern  Binge
drinking
JEL Classification I10  I12  I14
Introduction
The demand for alcohol is not just of interest in its own
right, but also because alcohol consumption has important
and significant societal costs through adverse effects on
crime and health, for example [1]. The traditional approach
to the economic analysis of alcohol demand has been to
consider the demand for total alcohol consumed in a given
period [2]. In taking this approach, it is assumed that the
frequency (how often an individual drinks) and intensity of
consumption (how much an individual drinks at each
drinking occasion) have no bearing on the utility an indi-
vidual receives. Frequency and intensity are in effect
treated as perfect substitutes. This simplifies the analytical
task but potentially hides important information about how
individuals consume alcohol. The pattern by which indi-
viduals consume alcohol is an important factor determining
health outcomes and risky health behaviors: evidence from
the USA shows that binge drinkers are 14 times more likely
to drink drive compared with non-binge drinkers [3] and
more generally the risk of death from acute alcohol-related
illness has been found to linearly increase with frequency
but exponentially increase with intensity [4]. How indi-
viduals drink has a bearing on the societal costs of alcohol
consumption. Evidence from Sweden, noting that binge
drinkers are more likely to be heavy drinkers, found that
‘‘at least for health care costs, the cost is quite heavily
concentrated in the heaviest drinking group’’ [1]. Under-
standing how frequency and intensity decisions affect the
overall quantity decision will allow greater understanding
as to what influences an individual’s drinking behavior. A
policy may have no effect on total quantity for example,
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but may have an effect on the frequency and intensity
decisions that would be masked by solely assessing the
quantity decision.
While the economic literature on alcohol has in general
focused on modeling the quantity of alcohol demanded, a
few studies have examined the determinants of frequency
of consumption specifically for binge drinkers [5, 6]. Naimi
et al. [7] have studied the socioeconomic factors associated
with intensive binge drinking, finding age\35 years, male
and less education amongst others as key risk factors.
However, even fewer studies have examined both the fre-
quency and intensity decisions together. Berggren and
Sutton [2] estimated a structural model of alcohol demand
where frequency and intensity entered the budget con-
straint as a multiplicative term. The authors found that for
spirit consumption in Sweden, frequency and intensity are
indeed simultaneous sub-decisions of the overall quantity
decision and that education and income are negatively
associated with intensity but have no effect on frequency.
Petrie et al. [8] consider an alternate form of the problem,
examining the determinants of the intensity frequency
ratio. Rather than modeling the budget constraint as
Berggren and Sutton [2] and Petrie et al. [8] define a
multiplicative quadratic utility function. The results in
Petrie et al. [8] are consistent with Berggren and Sutton [2]
in that they find a negative relation of the intensity fre-
quency ratio with education. A consequence of the
assumed form of the utility function the authors made is
that the intensity frequency ratio is related to neither price
changes nor income differences. Given the importance of
the budget constraint in defining an individual’s choice set,
it is undesirable to assume a utility function that yields this
result. More recent evidence from Australia has found a
negative association between the price of alcohol and the
number of days in which alcohol is consumed lightly, yet
found no association between price changes and the num-
ber of days of high-intensity drinking [9].
While the research by Berggren and Sutton [2] was
pioneering in breaking apart the quantity decision into its
constituent parts of frequency and intensity, some empiri-
cal issues remained. Prices of alcohol were not included
(because the data had no time element), which may be a
key component of any demand analysis. The data
requirements are also quite demanding when estimating, as
the authors did, a structural model. A structural model of
the form estimated by Berggren and Sutton [2] for fre-
quency and intensity requires instruments for frequency
and for intensity. However, the choice of instruments in
Berggren and Sutton [2] are debatable. A priori, it is quite
hard to think of many variables that predict the frequency
decision and not the intensity decision (and vice versa)
when so little is known about how these decisions are
made.
The literature on the demand for frequency and intensity
of alcohol consumption is under-researched even though it
has been shown to be important to consider both frequency
and intensity separately. We address this evidence gap in
this paper by utilizing new data from Sweden that allows
the consideration of the determinants of the demand for
frequency and intensity across three particular alcohol
types: beer, wine, and spirits. We split the analysis by
alcohol type because different individuals drink different
alcohol types and there may be systematic differences in
the characteristics of these individuals. Importantly, this
new data also allows the frequency and intensity decisions
to be compared between all of those who drink and the
subset who are binge drinkers giving new insights into the
binge drinking decision. The dataset is large and allows
further breakdown by gender, which is useful because there
are important biological differences in how much alcohol
women and men can tolerate and also preferences may
differ in important ways across the genders. This level of
detail ensures not only a better level of understanding of
the socioeconomic factors related to alcohol drinking pat-
terns but also yields results that should be of greater rele-
vance internationally. The analysis of a female wine binge
drinker in Sweden is more likely to yield results of rele-
vance to other female wine binge drinkers from other
countries than results not split by alcohol type, gender, and
drinking style participation preference. The paper unfolds
as follows: Sect. 2 first presents the data material and
following this presents the estimation strategy, Sect. 3
reports the results and Sect. 4 discusses the results and
concludes.
Data and methods
Data material
Monitor project survey description
Individual-level micro-data on individuals’ drinking pat-
terns and background characteristics was collected as part
of the Monitor project [10]. This is a repeated cross-sec-
tional survey performed by telephone interviews. A drinker
is defined as someone who had an alcoholic drink in the
last 30 days prior to the interview. A binge drinker, as
defined by the Monitor project study, is someone who in
the last 30 days has had one or more episodes where the
quantity of alcohol drank was at least: one bottle of wine
(75 cl), five shots of spirit (25 ml), four cans of strong
beer/cider ([3.5 %) or six cans of low alcohol content beer
(3.5 %). The same values are used for men and women to
define if they are a binge drinker or not. The definition used
here of a binge drinker is different to that of the alcohol use
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disorders test (AUDIT) questionnaire developed by the
World Health Organisation. The AUDIT questionnaire
takes gender into account asking how often an individual
had six or more units if female or eight or more units if
male, on a single occasion. Comparing to the AUDIT’s
definition of a binge drinker, the Monitor project’s
threshold for a binge drinker appears higher as measured
using wine, lower for spirits and about the mid-point for
beer.1 The quantities have been converted into centiliters of
pure alcohol to allow easier comparability across alcohol
types by multiplying in liter terms: beer by 4.62 %, wine
by 12.8 %, and spirits by 38 % (standard measures are
provided by CAN [11] and converted to % volume mea-
sures (1 cl pure alcohol is 7.8 g of alcohol). Frequency
corresponds to the number of drinking episodes in the last
30 days and intensity corresponds to the amount consumed
during a typical drinking episode. Quantity of alcohol
consumed is the product of frequency and intensity.
The data used in our analysis covers the years 2004
through to 2011 and consists of a total of 144,025 obser-
vations. The final sample size is 126,852 after accounting
for missing data (see Table 1 in Appendix 2 for details).2
The response rate in the period 2004–2011 fell from about
60 % to roughly between 35 and 45 % towards the end of
the study period [12]. Analysis of the response rate found
no systematic bias as a result of this fall in response [12]. A
standard problem with surveys regarding alcohol is the
lower response rate of heavy and or binge drinkers and the
resulting bias in alcohol consumption estimates [13]. This
survey is no exception in this regard as no compensation
for this known effect was made. Summary statistics for all
variables are shown in Table 1.
Aggregate national price indices and changes in alcohol
excise rates
National alcohol price indices for wine, spirits, and beer
(shown in Fig. 1) are provided by Statistics Sweden
(Statistika Centralbyra˚n). These price indices are monthly
and have been deflated by the CPI index (from Statistics
Sweden) so that each index is in December 2011 prices and
rebased so that they all equal 100 in December 2011. There
is no overall price trend for beer but wine and spirits have
seen a fall in real prices over the 7-year period. On January
1, 2008, alcohol duty was raised by about 13 % for beer
and about -2 % for wine, and remained unchanged for
spirits [14]. We use this exogenous variation in the analysis
by means of an interrupted time-series dummy (‘‘Alcohol
duty change 08’’) for the duty change on January 1, 2008.
There is a strong correlation between wine and spirit prices
(correlation coefficient of 0.96) and a weak correlation
between beer and wine (0.06) and beer and spirits (0.15).
To give an idea of the relative prices for each alcohol type,
the excise duty rates in equivalent 100 % volume/liter
terms in 2015 were 194 sek for beer, 196 sek for wine
(assuming a bottle of wine is 12.8 %) and 511 sek for
spirits [14]. While this is not the full picture of the cost of
alcohol, it does clearly show that spirits are an expensive
way to consume alcohol in Sweden.
Methods
Frequency and intensity
The aim of the analysis is to estimate the determinants of
demand for frequency and intensity. We start by assuming
that frequency and intensity have differential impacts on
individual utility. Let frequency, F, be defined as the total
number of days in which an individual drank in the last
30 days and intensity, I, be defined as the average quantity
drunk across all drinking sessions in the last 30 days of
type k alcohol consumed. In addition, let X be a matrix of
covariates observed alongside F and I, where X includes a
constant (column of 1 s), a linear time trend (month), an
interrupted time-series dummy (‘‘Alcohol duty change 0800)
that equals one after the duty change on 1st of January
2008 (own prices (Pk) are included in separate regression
equations which are provided in addition to the main
results and these exclude the alcohol duty change
dummy),3 net monthly income (Y) and individual charac-
teristics, Z, that also affect the alcohol consumption deci-
sion together yields the following two demand equations
for frequency and intensity (for ease of notation we omit
the subscripts for the k types of alcohol):
ln I ¼ lnX0bI þ vI ð1Þ
lnF ¼ lnX0bF þ vF ð2Þ
1 Translating the Monitor project binge drinking threshold into UK
alcohol units: one bottle of wine (75 cl) (assume 12 % vol =9 UK
units), five shots of spirit (25 ml) (assume 40 % vol = 5 UK units),
four cans of strong beer/cider (C3.5 %) (assume 5 % vol 330 ml
cans, =6.6 UK units) or six cans of low alcohol content beer (3.5 %)
(assume 3.5 % vol 330 ml cans, =6.9 UK units). The Audit
questionnaire defines a binge drinker as someone drinking six or
more units if female or eight or more units if male.
2 Individuals with missing values are dropped from the dataset.
3 These additional estimates include a linear time trend and all other
controls but not the excise rate dummy variable so that interpretation
is clear and we only use own prices due to the high correlation of the
price indices. Models have been estimated using all price indices in
all models (results not shown) but because of the high correlation
between the indices, the results were difficult to interpret. There
appears to be not enough variation between the price indices over
time to disentangle own and cross price elasticities during this time
period. We therefore only model using our own price elasticities.
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where ln F and ln I are observed if and only if the indi-
vidual chooses to drink (the participation equation is set out
below). The advantage of the log–log demand equation is
that interpretation is relatively straightforward: the coeffi-
cient corresponding to price in the vector b for example is a
price elasticity: a 1 % change in price leads to a b %
change in frequency/intensity consumed.4
The multiplication of frequency and intensity as defined
here equals the total quantity consumed in the last 30 days,
(Q = F  I) and is the definition used for quantity in our
data. Letting Q be the quantity of type k alcohol consumed,
yields the log–log demand equation for quantity:
lnQ ¼ lnX0bQ þ vQ ð3Þ
Substituting ln Q with the expressions for ln I ? ln F
into (3) yields:
Table 1 Variable means by sample
Variable Definition Whole sample Beer drinkers Wine drinkers Spirit drinkers
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
DRINKER 1 = Drank alcohol in last 30 days 0.82 0.73 – – – – – –
DRINK_BEER 1 = Drank beer in last 30 days 0.60 0.25 – – – – – –
DRINK_WINE 1 = Drank wine in last 30 days 0.54 0.62 – – – – – –
DRINK_SPIRIT 1 = Drank spirits in last 30 days 0.53 0.26 – – – – – –
BINGE DRINKER 1 = Binged in last 30 days 0.37 0.16 – – – – – –
FREQUENCY No. of days drank in last 30 5.17 3.30 5.50 5.33 3.68 2.51
INTENSITY Average grams pure alcohol/occasion 5.51 3.25 4.27 3.97 4.52 2.95
INCOME1 1 = Monthly income less than 10,000 sek 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.17
INCOME2 1 = Monthly income 10,000–14,999 sek 0.10 0.18 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.14
INCOME3 1 = Monthly income 15,000–19,999 sek 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.20 0.13 0.20
INCOME4 1 = Monthly income 20,000–29,000 sek 0.37 0.31 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.34
INCOME5 1 = Monthly income 30,000–39,999 sek 0.16 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.19 0.10
INCOME6 1 = Monthly income 40,000 sek? 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.05
COMPULSORY
SCHOOL
1 = Left school after compulsory
education (aged 16 years)
0.28 0.26 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.21
COLLEGE 1 = Finished college education (aged
19 years)
0.40 0.35 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.42 0.36
UNIVERSITY 1 = Finished University education 0.32 0.38 0.33 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.34 0.43
AGE Age in years 47.85 49.40 44.69 44.70 49.30 49.26 47.22 46.81
COHABIT 1 = Cohabits with one or more adults 0.74 0.69 0.75 0.73 0.78 0.71 0.75 0.71
EMP 1 = Currently employed 0.68 0.63 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.69 0.73 0.68
UNEMP 1 = Currently unemployed 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
STUDENT 1 = Currently studying full-time 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.11
INACTIVE 1 = Currently inactive (not seeking work,
retired)
0.22 0.26 0.13 0.12 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.19
N 59,251 67,601 35,649 17,144 31,927 42,217 31,243 17,731
Monitor project data, 2004–2011. 10,000 sek in 2014 was roughly equivalent to $1600 or €1150
Fig. 1 Monthly real alcohol price indices 2004–2011. Notes Data
source: SCB, consumer price index subcategory indices for beer, wine
and spirits (as per COICOP definition) are deflated by the headline
consumer price index and each is rebased to December 2011 prices so
that each index = 100 in December 2011
4 The log–log model of demand is limiting in that the model requires
the elasticities to be unitary otherwise the expenditures will not be
equal to total outlay (i.e., the budget will not add up) unless analysis is
within a restricted range of total outlay [15]. However, less restrictive
models require data on budget shares, which are not available. In part,
we get around this issue as a consequence of the analysis considering
both all drinkers and binge drinkers.
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lnQ ¼ ln I þ lnF ¼ lnX 0 bI þ bFð Þ þ vI þ vF ð4Þ
In our empirical analysis, we assume a log–log rela-
tionship between frequency/intensity and the explanatory
variables. Equation (4) shows that the coefficients for the
natural log of quantity equation will equal the sum of the
coefficients for the natural log of the sum of frequency
and intensity. As long as the assumption of a log–log
relationship between the covariates and quantity, fre-
quency, and intensity holds, then we can expect that on
average we can interpret the results for quantity as per
Eq. (4). In our empirical analysis, we estimate Eqs. (1),
(2), and (3).
Empirical approach
A correction for sample selection is included in the demand
equations. This is because a large number of individuals
with zero alcohol consumption or zero episodes of binge
drinking are observed and this is the result of an explicit
decision not to drink or binge drink. For some individuals,
the decision not to drink is absolute, and under no cir-
cumstances would they change their mind, for religious
reasons for example. For others, however, there may be
circumstances where they would participate; if prices fell
to a low enough level or their disposable income increased,
for example. For this group, it is possible that the error
terms of the participation and the quantity demanded
equations are correlated and standard OLS of frequency/
intensity demanded would be inconsistent in this case. A
type II Tobit is used to control for sample selection
endogeneity that relies on the functional form assumed for
the error term of the selection equation. This is a strong
identifying assumption, but it does mean we do not have to
identify an exclusion restriction, itself a difficult empirical
issue because it is not clear which factors are associated
with participation and not the frequency/intensity deci-
sions. The Heckman two-step method [16] assumes that the
error term from the selection equation e1 is standard normal
and therefore participation, D, is estimated via a Probit.
This then yields the conditional mean for Q, given partic-
ipation (similarly for frequency and intensity):
E QjX;D[ 0½  ¼ X 0b2 þ dE ljl[  X
0
b1
h i
¼ X 0b2 þ dk X
0
b1
  ð5Þ
where D* is an unobserved latent variable representing a
drink participation preference parameter that is greater than
zero when individuals are observed drinkers (D = 1) [17],
d is the covariance of the selection equation error term l
and the quantity equation error term vQ. k() is the inverse
Mills Ratio (IMR) or the hazard ratio where k ¼/ðÞ=UðÞ
and represents the probability of being censored assuming
e1 is distributed standard normal. The key assumption is:
vQ ¼ dlþ n; ð6Þ
where n is an error term and E(n|l) = 0. Thus unobserved
heterogeneity in the quantity (frequency and intensity)
equation is accounted for through the correlation between
the error terms. If d is zero, then the model becomes just a
double hurdle model. Information is provided on the range
of probit predictions to help assess how well the functional
form assumption is predicting the extreme probabilities in
order to give an indication of how likely the IMR is to be
identified in the quantity, frequency, and intensity
equations.
The form of the quantity/frequency/intensity equations
has been outlined above (Eqs. 1–3) and are estimated using
Eq. (5) providing the impact of the covariates conditional
on a positive outcome. In our analysis, we estimate only the
conditional effects of the covariates on frequency and
intensity because combining the participation effects with
the frequency and intensity effects to estimate the uncon-
ditional marginal effects would hide important differences
between the frequency and intensity responses, and it is
these differences that are of interest. For the binary choice
of participation/non-participation, we consider two over-
lapping groups of drinkers; the population of all drinkers
(which as a group include binge drinkers) and the sub-
group of binge drinkers. The participation equation for all
drinkers, where DAll = 1 for a drinker who has alcohol
consumption greater than zero in the last 30 days, is given
by:
DAll ¼ X0bAll þ uAll; ð7Þ
where the matrix X contains the same explanatory variables
as for the frequency and intensity equations.
For binge drinkers, the participation equation is the
same as Eq. (7) but now participation is defined as
DBinge = 1 for those who in the last 30 days had at least
one binge drinking episode (see the data description for the
exact definition), 0 if not a binge drinker (not a binge
drinker includes non-drinkers and drinkers who do not
binge drink). In this case, we are controlling for sample
selection into binge drinking in order to assess the fre-
quency and intensity decisions of this sub-group. There are
potentially many reasons for unobservables in the binge
participation equation to be correlated with the frequency
and intensity of binge drinkers. These could include a
preference for getting drunk or a lack of control once one
has started drinking. However, due to the limitations of the
data, we do not have information on such preferences and
therefore we rely on the same functional form assumption
of the Heckman two-step procedure to identify the inverse
Mills ratio, as we have done for all drinkers, in order to
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control for the potential unobserved correlation in the error
terms.
Exogenous variation
In general, prices are assumed to be endogenous in a
demand system equation. This is because while prices
affect demand, they are also affected by supply. In Sweden,
alcohol is highly regulated, and the only off-license is the
national off-license monopoly (Systembolaget). In 2012,
63 % of alcohol sales were through Systembolaget [12] and
Sweden has excise duties on alcohol amongst the highest in
the world. The normal demand and supply relationship is
therefore highly distorted by government taxation and
regulation. It is therefore argued that the price index used
can be seen as exogenously determined. Excise duties for
beer in fact saw a large jump in January 2008 (up 13 %)
and wine saw a small drop (-2 %). In our main analysis,
we exploit this by estimating an interrupted time-series
model including a linear time trend, leaving analysis of
prices to the Appendix (due to the high colinearity of the
price indices and remaining potential endogeneity issues
we include the results for prices purely for reference).
Potentially, more troublesome are the variables income,
employment status, and to a lesser extent, education. The
empirical issues are summarized in Cook and Moore [18].
A common result in the literature is that those who earn
more are more likely to drink, and drink more than those
who earn less. This has been thought to be a problem of
misclassification of non-drinkers, as many non-drinkers are
previous heavy drinkers, although Jarl and Gerdtham [19]
still found the same relation after controlling for this. For
most individuals in the sample, their education level will
have been previously established and therefore simultane-
ity is unlikely to be a big problem. However, there may be
a third variable that affects both the education decision and
the alcohol preference—possibly a risk preference that we
are unable to control for. For these variables, it is only
possible to describe the observed association.
Results
The results are estimated for males and females separately
due to the very different patterns of alcohol consumption
observed between the genders. The regression results are
presented for males, and where differences are observed
between the genders, these are discussed (results for
females are found in Appendix 1). In general, the regres-
sion results show that between the years 2004 and 2011
there has been a downward trend in drinking participation,
participation in binge drinking, frequency, and intensity of
drinking episodes as estimated by a linear trend function
(controlling for covariates). More men than women drank
alcohol, and on average men and women had similar wine
drinking patterns, but men drank more beer and spirits and
were more likely to binge drink (see Table 1).
The results of the alcohol participation decision are
presented in Appendix 1 (Table 5 for males and Table 7
for females) and are presented as average partial effects.
The results show that income and education were posi-
tively correlated with the binge drinking decision across all
types of alcohol, but less so in comparison to all drinkers.
The highest income group was 27 % more likely to par-
ticipate in beer consumption in comparison to the lowest
income group. This likelihood is slightly higher for wine
participation but about half as large for binge drinkers. A
much greater distinction between binge drinkers and all
drinkers is observed for the covariates of both age and
economic activity where being younger and economically
inactive are both stronger predictors for binge drinking
compared to all drinkers. All covariates are fairly similar in
magnitude across the alcohol types for binge drinkers,
suggesting binge drinkers distinguished to a lesser extent
between the alcohol types during the decision process to
binge drink. Women and men had statistically different
values for the explanatory variables in the wine participa-
tion equation, but these were fairly similar in size in a
broader economic sense. Women had much shallower
income and education gradients for beer and spirits con-
sumption participation. Turning to price, the excise duty
rate increase in January 2008, as assessed by interrupted
time-series, had a negative impact on participation across
the alcohol types (varying between -1 and -2 %
depending on alcohol type and drinking group), with the
exception of wine, which consistently saw no significant
impact by gender and drinking group. The additional
regressions for participation that include price, but not the
excise duty rate dummy variable (see Tables 6 and 8 in
Appendix 1), find generally positive but largely insignifi-
cant own price elasticities for all alcohol types and drinker
types and the effect sizes are very large, ranging between
-9 and 37 % for a 1 % change in price levels (controlling
for a linear trend).
The results for the demand for frequency and intensity
conditional on participation are shown in Tables 2–4
(Tables 10–12 in Appendix 1 for females). The fitted val-
ues of the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) have a positive and
statistically significant effect on the beer and wine fre-
quency decision but for men only. Sample selection
appears to be a bigger concern for binge drinkers with
much larger IMR values (again only for males). The IMR
values for binge drinkers suggest that those that select to be
binge drinkers have a higher frequency of beer and spirits
consumption, lower beer intensity consumption, and a
higher spirits intensity consumption compared to a random
500 G. Heckley et al.
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draw from the population. As shown in the participation
equations [Appendix, Tables 5, 6 (males) and 7, 8 (fe-
males)], there are mixed successes in the Probit model’s
ability to predict extreme low and high probabilities,
especially for women. Therefore, where the IMR is not
significant (in Tables 2–4), this does not necessarily sug-
gest that unobserved heterogeneity is not an issue. It is
possible that there remains unobserved heterogeneity that
Table 2 Beer frequency and
intensity demand equation
estimates, males
All drinkers Binge drinkers
Frequency Intensity Frequency Intensity
Linear time trend -0.01 -0.00 -0.02* 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Alcohol duty change 08 -0.05** 0.04*** -0.07** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
INCOME1 (reference)
INCOME2 0.07 0.00 0.12* -0.06
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
INCOME3 0.23*** -0.03 0.28*** -0.14**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07)
INCOME4 0.37*** -0.02 0.46*** -0.23**
(0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.10)
INCOME5 0.47*** -0.08 0.56*** -0.36***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.16) (0.12)
INCOME6 0.48*** -0.16* 0.57*** -0.47***
(0.13) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12)
COMPULSORY SCHOOL (reference)
COLLEGE 0.07*** -0.01 0.15*** -0.11***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
UNIVERSITY -0.02 -0.14*** 0.01 -0.18***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
LNAGE -0.15* -0.83*** -0.54** -0.25
(0.08) (0.06) (0.24) (0.18)
EMP (reference)
INACTIVE -0.12** -0.17*** -0.29** 0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.12) (0.09)
UNEMP 0.05 0.08*** 0.03 0.09**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
STUDENT -0.02 -0.10*** -0.07 -0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
COHABIT -0.02 -0.20*** -0.11*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
IMR 0.58** -0.18 0.97*** -0.71***
(0.25) (0.19) (0.34) (0.26)
CONSTANT 1.25*** 4.86*** 2.24*** 3.59***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.48) (0.36)
Participation observations 59,251 59,251 59,251 59,251
Freq/intens observations 35,650 35,650 19,297 19,297
Proportion drink/binge 60 % 60 % 33 % 33 %
Results are conditional on beer drinking participation. Reference categories are income\10,000 sek,
compulsory schooling, employed, and living alone. Alcohol duty change is a dummy set to one after
January 1, 2008, when there was a change in beer and wine excise duties. Month dummies to capture
resampling effects and seasonality and regional dummies are included in all models (reference categories:
Stockholm and January). Testing the null of no effect: *** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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is correlated with the errors due to sample selection for the
equations where the IMR is non-significant.
The impact of the alcohol duty rate changes in 2008
reduced the frequency of beer consumption by 5 % but
raised the intensity of drinking episodes by 4 %. An impact
is also observed for beer binge drinkers where frequency
reduced by 7 % but intensity increased by 7 %. It appears
that the excise duty change for beer also either had an
Table 3 Wine frequency and
intensity demand equation
estimates, males
All drinkers Binge drinkers
Frequency Intensity Frequency Intensity
Linear time trend -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.04** -0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
Alcohol duty change 08 -0.01 0.02* 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02)
INCOME1 (reference)
INCOME2 0.05 0.00 -0.27** -0.03
(0.05) (0.03) (0.14) (0.07)
INCOME3 0.29*** 0.03 -0.52** -0.02
(0.06) (0.03) (0.23) (0.12)
INCOME4 0.52*** 0.04 -0.83** -0.01
(0.08) (0.05) (0.39) (0.20)
INCOME5 0.82*** 0.05 -0.96* 0.01
(0.11) (0.06) (0.51) (0.26)
INCOME6 1.06*** 0.05 -0.81 0.02
(0.12) (0.07) (0.52) (0.27)
COMPULSORY SCHOOL (reference)
COLLEGE 0.65*** -0.00 -0.14 0.08
(0.06) (0.04) (0.21) (0.11)
UNIVERSITY 0.96*** -0.04 1.37*** 0.11
(0.05) (0.03) (0.28) (0.14)
LNAGE 0.14*** -0.14*** 0.74*** -0.12
(0.02) (0.01) (0.26) (0.14)
EMP (reference)
INACTIVE 0.08* 0.08*** -0.10 0.08**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.09) (0.04)
UNEMP 0.42*** -0.04 -0.06 -0.03
(0.06) (0.03) (0.11) (0.05)
STUDENT 0.28*** -0.07*** 0.18*** -0.08***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
COHABIT -0.11*** 0.03 0.30* 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.16) (0.08)
IMR 1.04*** -0.07 -2.08** 0.14
(0.17) (0.10) (0.92) (0.48)
CONSTANT -3.98*** 1.58*** -0.95** 0.94***
(0.41) (0.24) (0.42) (0.21)
Participation observations 59,251 59,251 59,251 59,251
Freq/intens observations 31,925 31,925 14,414 14,414
Proportion drink/binge 54 % 54 % 24 % 24 %
Results are conditional on wine drinking participation. Reference categories are income\10,000 sek,
compulsory schooling, employed, and living alone. Alcohol duty change is a dummy set to one after
January 1st 2008 when there was a change in beer and wine excise duties. Month dummies to capture
resampling effects and seasonality and regional dummies are included in all models (reference categories:
Stockholm and January). Testing the null of no effect: *** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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income effect and subsequent substitution effect or com-
plementary effect as it negatively impacted on the demand
for frequency and intensity of spirits. The impact of own
prices on frequency and intensity appears to be negative for
frequency (see Table 9 in Appendix 1). Significant and
large impacts of own prices are observed for frequency of
binge drinkers of wine and beer for males but not for
females. Similarly to the participation equations, the
Table 4 Spirits frequency and
intensity demand equation
estimates, males
All drinkers Binge drinkers
Frequency Intensity Frequency Intensity
Linear time trend -0.01 -0.02** -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Alcohol duty change 08 -0.06** 0.01 -0.25*** -0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.08)
INCOME1 (reference)
INCOME2 -0.06 -0.00 0.29* 0.27**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.16) (0.13)
INCOME3 -0.00 0.07 0.64** 0.47**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.25) (0.21)
INCOME4 0.06 0.12 1.08*** 0.77**
(0.17) (0.15) (0.39) (0.32)
INCOME5 0.12 0.12 1.45*** 0.96**
(0.22) (0.19) (0.49) (0.40)
INCOME6 0.18 0.09 1.55*** 0.92**
(0.24) (0.20) (0.50) (0.41)
COMPULSORY SCHOOL (reference)
COLLEGE -0.00 -0.28*** 0.05 -0.33***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
UNIVERSITY 0.26*** -0.43*** -1.53** -1.75***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.64) (0.53)
LNAGE 0.18*** 0.01 -0.41 -0.42**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.25) (0.21)
EMP (reference)
INACTIVE 0.10** 0.13*** 0.11 0.11
(0.04) (0.03) (0.12) (0.10)
UNEMP 0.11** -0.04 -0.04 -0.22**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.10)
STUDENT -0.05* -0.12*** -0.26*** -0.31***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.07)
COHABIT -0.05 -0.07 -0.65*** -0.44**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.21) (0.17)
IMR -0.05 0.38 3.14*** 2.57***
(0.50) (0.43) (1.09) -0.89
CONSTANT 0.07 2.76*** 2.93*** 5.12***
(0.35) (0.30) (1.06) (0.87)
Participation observations 59,251 59,251 59,251 59,251
Freq/intens observations 31,243 31,243 16,641 16,641
Proportion drink/binge 53 % 53 % 28 % 28 %
Results are conditional on spirit drinking participation. Reference categories are income\10,000 sek,
compulsory schooling, employed, and living alone. Alcohol duty change is a dummy set to one after
January 1, 2008, when there was a change in beer and wine excise duties. Month dummies to capture
resampling effects and seasonality and regional dummies are included in all models (reference categories:
Stockholm and January). Testing the null of no effect: *** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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impacts of own prices are very large in comparison to the
impacts of the alcohol duty changes and other covariates.
Broadly, across the alcohol types there was a positive
income gradient to frequency demand and a negative
income gradient to intensity demand. The highest income
group had a 48 % higher frequency of beer consumption
and 16 % lower intensity of beer consumption in com-
parison to the lowest income group. Binge beer drinkers
had a steeper income gradient in both frequency and
intensity. The income pattern for spirits drinkers was
similar to that of beer consumption with regards to fre-
quency. Unlike beer, spirits had a positive income gradient
in intensity. Higher education levels predict lower levels of
intensity for beer and spirits consumption, but higher levels
of frequency of beer and wine consumption. Women differ
slightly from this pattern in that there is no clear rela-
tionship between income, education and frequency or
intensity for drinkers of beer and spirits.
Most often, where a positive gradient for income and
education is observed for the quantity equation (see
Appendix, Tables 14, 15, 16, 17), this is driven by the
positive income and education gradients in frequency
demand dominating the negative income and education
gradients in intensity demand and vice versa. Where no
statistically significant relation is observed for the quantity
equation, this can obscure important responses. For
example, the income response of beer binge drinkers shows
a positive income gradient for frequency and negative
gradient for intensity but no significant effect for quantity.
Discussion
This paper has broadened the evidence base regarding the
determinants of frequency and intensity demand for alco-
hol using a large individual level dataset from Sweden that
has allowed the analysis to be extended to different alcohol
types, drinker types, and to be split by gender. The time
period under analysis is interesting, as it is a period where a
reduction in drinkers, binge drinkers, quantity, frequency,
and intensity of alcohol consumption has been observed.
These trends are important to note as they involved large
reductions in consumption generally during a period of
relatively small changes in the real prices of alcohol. Real
(inflation-adjusted) prices of beer, wine, and spirits, in
general, fell at the same time that the proportion of the
population who drank and the intensity in which they
consumed fell. With the entry to the EU, Sweden saw
increasing liberalization of alcohol trade with other EU
members and alcohol private import quotas were fully
abolished by 2004. Alcohol consumption had been
increasing up until 2004, but since 2004 overall alcohol
consumption has been on the decline [12]. Our results
generally find large positive but largely insignificant own
price elasticities. The participation price elasticities are
significant for binge drinkers of wine and spirits, but this
cannot be a realistic result. More likely is that preferences
for alcohol by binge drinkers has changed in Sweden in a
way that cannot adequately be explained by changes in
price, controlling for other observables (including a linear
time trend to capture the general decline in consumption
patterns), and that we have not been able to explain these
changing preferences adequately.
We now turn to the impact of the change in excise duty and
its analysis using interrupted time-series analysis. It appears
that the alcohol excise duty increase enacted in January of
2008 did reduce beer drinking participation and frequency of
consumption but raised the intensity. It also appears to have
reduced both intensity and frequency of wine and spirits
consumption. The results of the excise duty rate change on
beer consumption are similar to those of Byrnes et al. [9] who
found a negative price elasticity of frequency of light
drinking days. However, we find that the impact on binge
drinkers was similar to that for all drinkers, but stronger for
males, and Byrnes et al. [9] found no impact on frequency of
heavy drinking days. Why there was a positive intensity
response to the excise rate change is not clear. The price
response to the excise duty change observed here suggests
that individuals respond to increased prices by drinking less
often but substitute somewhat by increasing how intensely
they drink. We also observe that the excise rate change for
beer had no measurable effect on quantity consumed, yet it
increased the intensity of consumption, highlighting the
importance of frequency and intensity analysis. It is impor-
tant to note that interrupted time-series analysis attempts to
capture the effect of a time-specific policy, but due to a lack
of a control group, it is possible that other events occurred at
the same time as the change in excise rates that we are unable
to control for.
Previous analysis of the determinants of frequency and
intensity of alcohol consumption [2] concluded that income
and education are negatively associated with intensity and
that neither had an effect on frequency. The results of the
current paper find that generally across different alcohol
types and different types of drinkers there was a positive
income and education gradient with frequency and a neg-
ative income and education gradient with intensity.
Broadly, we find income and education had a positive
gradient with drinking and binge drinking participation,
quantity and frequency demanded, but a negative gradient
with intensity demanded. The results presented here sug-
gest the reason behind the positive income gradient with
alcohol demand documented in Cook and Moore [18] is
due to a frequency relation. A potential explanation for the
observed positive relationship between income and drink-
ing frequency could be that higher-earning individuals can
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afford to socialize more often and socializing norms
involve the consumption of alcohol.
The key difference between men’s and women’s drinking
patterns is that women predominantly drank wine. Relatively
few women drank beer or spirits (in grams of alcohol terms)
whereas men were more evenly split amongst the alcohol
types. Wine is very different to beer and spirits in terms of
who drinks it and who drinks it more frequently and inten-
sely. Income and education were positively associated with
both frequency and intensity demand for wine. Wine appears
to be a luxury good, favored by higher earners and the more
educated, especially women.
The results for the sub-group of binge drinkers show
important differences to the population of drinkers as a whole.
Participation in binge drinking is strongly predicted by young
age and economic inactivity. Binge drinkers appeared to dif-
ferentiate between the alcohol types to a lesser degree in
comparison to average drinkers, possibly reflecting a different
attitude to alcohol. Across all alcohol types the more educated
bingers drank less intensely, possibly reflecting the increased
opportunity cost of intense drinking episodes and/or greater
health awareness, but they drank more often.
As set out in the introduction, binge drinkers are associ-
ated with higher social costs. The results presented here
highlight the complexities associated with attempting to
limit the social costs of this harmful drinking behavior. An
alcohol-related policy targeted at the less educated would,
for example, have to understand why the less educated are
less likely to binge drink but the intensity of less educated
individuals who binge drink is higher. Policy aimed at
reducing socioeconomic-related health inequalities needs to
consider the particular complexities of alcohol demand
highlighted in this study. Previous research investigating
various socioeconomic measures related to alcohol partici-
pation inequality in Sweden by Combes et al. [20] has found
alcohol participation to be positively associated with
income. This is consistent with the findings of the current
paper. However, the demand for intensity by binge drinkers
is negatively associated with education and income. Given
that binge drinkers who drink most intensely are the indi-
viduals who will have the worse wider health outcomes, the
findings of this paper suggest it is in fact individuals with low
education and low income levels who drink more intensely
that should be the focus of policy, contrary to Combes et al
[20]. In fact, a newly designed randomized trial in the UK
[21] is focusing exactly on this group, highlighting how the
results presented here could help focus policy interventions.
The results presented in this paper are robust associations
and are useful for highlighting which groups of individuals
drink in the most harmful way and where alcohol policy
could most effectively be targeted in order to reduce alcohol-
related harm and its negative impact on health. However, the
results are not free from endogeneity or simultaneity. It
therefore cannot be said that policy aimed at changing the
factors observed in this study, such as education levels, will
change alcohol drinking behavior as might be expected if the
results were interpreted as causal effects. Addressing the
potential endogeneity and two-way causality issues that
potentially exist in the analysis presented here is a valuable
line of investigation for future research.
The results of this paper are subject to a few further lim-
itations that impact the potential interpretation of the results.
While the data used in this paper are very detailed and have
enabled us to examine in more detail the demand for fre-
quency and intensity, the main limitation of the paper is the
quality of the data we have used. This reflects the challenging
nature of alcohol demand analysis. As noted in the data
description, the Monitor project data saw a reduction in
response rate with a response rate near the end of the survey
period in the range of 35–45 %. There is also evidence of
missing values bias where those who report an income are
more educated, male, younger, and more likely to be
employed and those who fail to report their drinking
behaviors are younger, with lower income and who are male.
The Monitor project also made no effort to counter the fact
that heavy drinkers are less likely to respond to survey
questionnaires. There has been research looking into the
response rate of the survey data and this found no significant
issues, but nonetheless, a response rate of 35 % will always
be a concern, and the results found in this paper could just
reflect a subset of the population who are willing to respond
to such a survey. It is also concerning that missing values can
be predicted by covariates, and beyond controlling for these
covariates the results have to be interpreted with caution, as
there may be other factors that both predict alcohol drinking
behavior and non-response to a particular question. Finally,
our definition of binge drinker is not the same as the more
internationally recognized definition used in the AUDIT
survey. This may potentially explain differences between the
results found here and those found elsewhere, especially as
the definition used in this paper does not distinguish between
genders and the differences we observe between genders
could be driven by our definition.
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Appendix 1: Supplementary results
See Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17.
Table 5 Drinking participation
equations, males
Variables Alcohol selection equation Binge drinking selection equation
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits
Linear time trend -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Alcohol duty change 08 -0.01* 0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
INCOME1 (reference)
INCOME2 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
INCOME3 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
INCOME4 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
INCOME5 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
INCOME6 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
COMPULSORY SCHOOL (reference)
COLLEGE 0.06*** 0.12*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
UNIVERSITY 0.01** 0.21*** 0.04*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LNAGE -0.20*** 0.17*** -0.04*** -0.31*** -0.11*** -0.24***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EMP (reference)
INACTIVE -0.09*** 0.01 0.02*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
UNEMP -0.00 0.02* 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
STUDENT -0.02** 0.14*** 0.05*** -0.04*** 0.03** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
COHABIT 0.02*** 0.09*** 0.03*** -0.04*** -0.01** -0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Predicted min 0.09 0.05 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.01
Predicted max 0.93 0.95 0.87 0.89 0.69 0.82
N 59,251 59,251 59,251 59,251 59,251 59,251
Estimates are average partial effects. Dummies from same category are estimated with all other dummies in
same category set to zero. Reference categories are income\10,000 sek, compulsory schooling, employed,
and living alone. Alcohol duty change is a dummy set to one after January 1, 2008, when there was a
change in beer and wine excise duties. Month dummies to capture resampling effects and seasonality and
regional dummies are included in all models (reference categories: Stockholm and January). Testing the
null of no effect: *** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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Table 6 Drinking participation
equations, males (price indices
results)
Variables Alcohol selection equation Binge drinking selection equation
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits
Linear time trend -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln (beer price index) 0.01 0.02
(0.07) (0.06)
Ln (wine price index) 0.19 0.27**
(0.13) (0.11)
Ln (spirit price index) 0.15 0.31**
(0.15) (0.12)
N 59,251 59,251 59,251 59,251 59,251 59,251
See notes for Table 5. Results for income, education, employment status, and cohabiting are not shown but
are included in the regression. The excise duty rate change in January 2008 is not controlled for in these
results
Table 7 Drinking participation
equations, females
Variables Alcohol selection equation Binge drinking selection equation
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits
Linear time trend -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Alcohol duty change 08 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01** -0.00 -0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
INCOME1 (reference)
INCOME2 0.02*** 0.08*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
INCOME3 0.06*** 0.13*** 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
INCOME4 0.09*** 0.20*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
INCOME5 0.10*** 0.26*** 0.12*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
INCOME6 0.12*** 0.28*** 0.12*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
COMPULSORY SCHOOL (reference)
COLLEGE 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
UNIVERSITY 0.03*** 0.15*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LNAGE -0.07*** 0.16*** -0.04*** -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.15***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EMP (reference)
INACTIVE -0.11*** -0.06*** -0.01 -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
UNEMP 0.01 -0.02* 0.02* 0.01* 0.00 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
STUDENT 0.03*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
COHABIT 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.02*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Frequency and intensity of alcohol consumption: new evidence from Sweden 507
123
Table 8 Drinking participation
equations, females (price
indices results)
Variables Alcohol selection equation Binge drinking selection equation
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits
Linear time trend -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln (beer price index) -0.09 0.01
(0.06) (0.04)
Ln (wine price index) 0.01 0.37***
(0.11) (0.09)
Ln (spirit price index) 0.01 0.25***
(0.12) (0.08)
N 67,601 67,601 67,601 67,601 67,601 67,601
See notes for Table 7. Results for income, education, employment status, and cohabiting are not shown but
are included in the regression. The excise duty rate change in January 2008 is not controlled for in these
results
Table 9 Frequency and
intensity demand equation
estimates, males (price indices
results)
All drinkers Binge drinkers
Frequency Intensity Frequency Intensity
Beer
Linear time trend -0.01*** 0.00 -0.03*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln (beer price index) -0.62*** 0.10 -0.58** 0.03
(0.19) (0.14) (0.28) (0.21)
Wine
Linear time trend -0.03*** -0.01*** 0.03 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
Ln (wine price index) -0.54 -0.27 -2.74** -0.40
(0.41) (0.21) (1.16) (0.47)
Spirits
Linear time trend -0.03** -0.02** -0.10*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Ln (spirit price index) -0.20 -0.16 1.96 1.19
(0.38) (0.34) (1.71) (1.35)
See notes for Table 2. For each alcohol type the results presented are from separately estimated regressions.
Results for income, education, employment status, and cohabiting are not shown but are included in the
regression. The excise duty rate change in January 2008 is not controlled for in these results
Table 7 continued
Variables Alcohol selection equation Binge drinking selection equation
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits
Predicted min 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01
Predicted max 0.52 0.94 0.61 0.47 0.55 0.49
N 67,601 67,601 67,601 67,601 67,601 67,601
Estimates are average partial effects. Dummies from same category are estimated with all other dummies in
same category set to zero. Reference categories are income\10,000 sek, compulsory schooling, employed
and living alone. Alcohol duty change is a dummy set to one after January 1, 2008, when there was a
change in beer and wine excise duties. Month dummies to capture resampling effects and seasonality and
regional dummies are included in all models (reference categories: Stockholm and January). Testing the
null of no effect: *** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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Table 10 Beer frequency and
intensity demand equation
estimates, females
All drinkers Binge drinkers
Frequency Intensity Frequency Intensity
Linear time trend -0.09 0.03 -0.09 0.08
(0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07)
Alcohol duty change 08 -0.14 0.08 -0.17 0.25
(0.14) (0.06) (0.17) (0.19)
INCOME1 (reference)
INCOME2 0.33 -0.07 0.51 -0.43
(0.22) (0.10) (0.33) (0.36)
INCOME3 0.75 -0.24 0.59 -0.60
(0.51) (0.23) (0.42) (0.46)
INCOME4 1.08 -0.39 1.02 -1.02
(0.68) (0.31) (0.63) (0.70)
INCOME5 1.30 -0.54 1.24 -1.40
(0.82) (0.37) (0.81) (0.89)
INCOME6 1.49 -0.63 1.39 -1.56
(0.94) (0.43) (0.88) (0.97)
COMPULSORY SCHOOL (reference)
COLLEGE 0.53 -0.22 0.69 -0.77
(0.34) (0.16) (0.43) (0.47)
UNIVERSITY 0.35 -0.26** 0.33* -0.45**
(0.24) (0.11) (0.20) (0.22)
LNAGE -0.73 -0.52** -2.66 2.13
(0.46) (0.21) (1.70) (1.87)
EMP (reference)
INACTIVE -1.18 0.47 -1.13 1.39
(0.79) (0.36) (0.83) (0.92)
UNEMP 0.13 0.12 0.28 -0.04
(0.16) (0.07) (0.22) (0.25)
STUDENT 0.40 -0.15 0.39 -0.48
(0.27) (0.12) (0.28) (0.31)
COHABIT 0.19 -0.25*** -0.55 0.46
(0.12) (0.05) (0.37) (0.40)
IMR 4.35 -2.00 3.67 -4.04
(2.87) (1.32) (2.36) (2.60)
CONSTANT -2.32 5.65*** 4.38** 0.46
(2.21) (1.02) (2.20) (2.42)
Participation observations 67,601 67,601 67,601 67,601
Freq/intens observations 17,148 17,148 6117 6117
Proportion drink/binge 25 % 25 % 9 % 9 %
Results are conditional on beer drinking participation. Reference categories are income\10,000 sek,
compulsory schooling, employed, and living alone. Alcohol duty change is a dummy set to one after
January 1, 2008, when there was a change in beer and wine excise duties. Month dummies to capture
resampling effects and seasonality and regional dummies are included in all models (reference categories:
Stockholm and January). Testing the null of no effect: *** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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Table 11 Wine frequency and
intensity demand equation
estimates, females
All drinkers Binge drinkers
Frequency Intensity Frequency Intensity
Linear time trend -0.01 -0.02*** -0.03 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Alcohol duty change 08 -0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06)
INCOME1 (reference)
INCOME2 0.05* 0.07*** 0.26** -0.15
(0.03) (0.02) (0.13) (0.13)
INCOME3 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.34* -0.25
(0.05) (0.03) (0.18) (0.19)
INCOME4 0.30*** 0.18*** 0.62** -0.45
(0.07) (0.04) (0.28) (0.28)
INCOME5 0.48*** 0.19*** 0.95*** -0.66*
(0.09) (0.05) (0.37) (0.37)
INCOME6 0.55*** 0.19*** 1.11*** -0.72*
(0.09) (0.06) (0.40) (0.41)
COMPULSORY SCHOOL (reference)
COLLEGE 0.34*** 0.02 0.63*** -0.31*
(0.05) (0.03) (0.17) (0.17)
UNIVERSITY 0.56*** -0.13*** -0.64 1.21*
(0.06) (0.03) (0.67) (0.68)
LNAGE 0.03 -0.16*** -0.39 0.40
(0.02) (0.02) (0.25) (0.26)
EMP (reference)
INACTIVE 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09)
UNEMP 0.24*** 0.05* 0.33** -0.22*
(0.05) (0.03) (0.13) (0.13)
STUDENT 0.15*** -0.03** -0.20 0.17
(0.02) (0.01) (0.14) (0.14)
COHABIT -0.09*** -0.02 -0.46** 0.42*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.22) (0.22)
IMR 0.34 0.21 1.96* -1.98*
(0.21) (0.13) (1.05) (1.06)
CONSTANT -1.42*** 1.59*** 0.53 0.22
(0.39) (0.24) (0.83) (0.84)
Participation observations 67,601 67,601 67,601 67,601
Freq/intens observations 42,208 42,208 9114 9114
Proportion drink/binge 62 % 62 % 13 % 13 %
Results are conditional on wine drinking participation. Reference categories are income\10,000 sek,
compulsory schooling, employed, and living alone. Alcohol duty change is a dummy set to one after
January 1, 2008, when there was a change in beer and wine excise duties. Month dummies to capture
resampling effects and seasonality and regional dummies are included in all models (reference categories:
Stockholm and January). Testing the null of no effect: *** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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Table 12 Spirits frequency and
intensity demand equation
estimates, females
All drinkers Binge drinkers
Frequency Intensity Frequency Intensity
Linear time trend -0.06* -0.03 -0.18* -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03)
Alcohol duty change 08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 -0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.22) (0.06)
INCOME1 (reference)
INCOME2 0.08 0.07 0.64 0.13
(0.07) (0.06) (0.44) (0.12)
INCOME3 0.23 0.17 0.94 0.22
(0.14) (0.12) (0.64) (0.18)
INCOME4 0.34 0.21 1.46 0.31
(0.22) (0.19) (0.95) (0.26)
INCOME5 0.52 0.29 2.12 0.43
(0.32) (0.28) (1.33) (0.37)
INCOME6 0.60* 0.25 2.22 0.33
(0.32) (0.28) (1.35) (0.38)
COMPULSORY SCHOOL (reference)
COLLEGE 0.08 -0.12* 0.44 -0.21**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.33) (0.09)
UNIVERSITY -0.02 -0.61*** -4.38 -1.42*
(0.10) (0.09) (2.75) (0.77)
LNAGE 0.10*** 0.00 -0.80 -0.16
(0.03) (0.03) (0.60) (0.17)
EMP (reference)
INACTIVE 0.16** 0.18*** 0.45 0.19**
(0.07) (0.05) (0.35) (0.09)
UNEMP 0.43* 0.18 0.75 0.07
(0.24) (0.21) (0.50) (0.14)
STUDENT 0.06 -0.03 -0.72* -0.26**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.43) (0.12)
COHABIT -0.36 -0.25 -1.28* -0.31
(0.24) (0.21) (0.74) (0.21)
IMR 1.37 0.88 5.54 1.21
(1.02) (0.89) (3.38) -0.95
CONSTANT -0.83 2.20*** 7.60* 4.52***
(0.81) (0.70) (4.36) (1.22)
Participation observations 67,601 67,601 67,601 67,601
Freq/intens observations 17,738 17,738 6061 6061
Proportion drink/binge 26 % 26 % 9 % 9 %
Results are conditional on spirit drinking participation. Reference categories are income\10,000 sek,
compulsory schooling, employed, and living alone. Alcohol duty change is a dummy set to one after
January 1, 2008, when there was a change in beer and wine excise duties. Month dummies to capture
resampling effects and seasonality and regional dummies are included in all models (reference categories:
Stockholm and January). Testing the null of no effect: *** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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Table 13 Frequency and
intensity demand equation
estimates, females (price indices
results)
All drinkers Binge drinkers
Frequency Intensity Frequency Intensity
Beer
Linear time trend -0.11 0.05 -0.13 0.13
(0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09)
Ln (beer price index) -1.09 0.59 -0.38 0.01
(1.17) (0.53) (1.21) (1.28)
Wine
Linear time trend -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln (wine price index) -0.59** 0.02 1.98 -2.88*
(0.30) (0.18) (1.70) (1.74)
Spirits
Linear time trend -0.08** -0.04 -0.13 -0.04*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02)
Ln (spirit price index) -0.76 -0.14 6.02 1.03
(0.65) (0.46) (5.71) (1.53)
See notes for Table 10. For each alcohol type the results presented are from separately estimated regres-
sions. Results for income, education, employment status, and cohabiting are not shown but are included in
the regression. The excise duty rate change in January 2008 is not controlled for in these results
Table 14 Alcohol log–log demand equation estimates conditional on participation, males
Variables Pure alcohol consumed by all drinkers Pure alcohol consumed by binge drinkers
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits
Alcohol duty change 08 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.37**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.17)
Linear time trend -0.01* -0.03*** -0.04** -0.01 0.03 -0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05)
INCOME1 (reference)
INCOME2 0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.06 -0.30** 0.55*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.13) (0.30)
INCOME3 0.20** 0.32*** 0.07 0.14 -0.54** 1.12**
(0.10) (0.07) (0.16) (0.10) (0.23) (0.46)
INCOME4 0.36** 0.56*** 0.17 0.23 -0.84** 1.86***
(0.14) (0.10) (0.24) (0.16) (0.38) (0.70)
INCOME5 0.39** 0.86*** 0.24 0.20 -0.95* 2.41***
(0.16) (0.13) (0.31) (0.19) (0.49) (0.89)
INCOME6 0.32* 1.11*** 0.26 0.10 -0.79 2.47***
(0.16) (0.14) (0.33) (0.19) (0.51) (0.91)
COMPULSORY SCHOOL (reference)
COLLEGE 0.06 0.37*** -0.10** 0.04 -0.23 0.36
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.19) (0.23)
UNIVERSITY -0.16*** 0.65*** -0.29*** -0.17*** -0.06 -0.28**
(0.02) (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.20) (0.11)
LNAGE -0.98*** 0.91*** -0.17*** -0.79*** 1.48*** -3.28***
(0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.29) (0.27) (1.17)
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Table 15 Alcohol log–log demand equation estimates conditional on participation, males (price indices results)
Variables Pure alcohol consumed by all drinkers Pure alcohol consumed by binge drinkers
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits
Linear time trend -0.01** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.00 0.01 -0.18***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06)
ln (beer price index) -0.53** -0.56*
(0.24) (0.29)
ln (wine price index) -0.81* -3.14***
(0.48) (1.12)
ln (spirit price index) -0.36 3.15
(0.53) (3.06)
See notes for Table 14. Results for income, education, employment status, and cohabiting are not shown but are included in the regression. The
excise duty rate change in January 2008 is not controlled for in these results
Table 16 Alcohol log–log demand equation estimates conditional on participation, females
Variables Pure alcohol consumed by all drinkers Pure alcohol consumed by binge drinkers
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits
Alcohol duty change 08 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.20
(0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.27)
Linear time trend -0.05* -0.02*** -0.10* -0.01 -0.01 -0.21*
(0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.12)
Table 14 continued
Variables Pure alcohol consumed by all drinkers Pure alcohol consumed by binge drinkers
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits
EMP (reference)
INACTIVE -0.29*** 0.00 0.19*** -0.25* 0.62** -0.84*
(0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.15) (0.25) (0.46)
UNEMP 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.12** -0.02 0.23
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.23)
STUDENT -0.12*** 0.38*** 0.07 -0.11** -0.09 -0.26
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (0.22)
COHABIT -0.22*** 0.21*** -0.16*** -0.22*** 0.10*** -0.57***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.16)
CONSTANT 6.11*** -2.40*** 2.82*** 5.83*** -0.01 8.05***
(0.11) (0.49) (0.48) (0.58) (0.41) (1.93)
IMR 0.39 0.98*** 0.32 0.27 -1.94** 5.70***
(0.32) (0.21) (0.69) (0.42) (0.90) (1.98)
Participation observations 59,251 59,251 59,251 59,251 59,251 59,251
Quantity observations 35,650 31,925 31,244 19,297 14,414 16,641
Proportion drink/binge 60 % 54 % 53 % 33 % 24 % 28 %
Results are conditional on beer/wine/spirit drinking participation. Reference categories are income\10,000 sek, compulsory schooling,
employed, and living alone. Alcohol duty change is a dummy set to one after January 1, 2008, when there was a change in beer and wine excise
duties. Month dummies to capture resampling effects and seasonality and regional dummies are included in all models (reference categories:
Stockholm and January). Testing the null of no effect: *** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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Table 16 continued
Variables Pure alcohol consumed by all drinkers Pure alcohol consumed by binge drinkers
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits
INCOME1 (reference)
INCOME2 0.27** 0.12*** 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.76
(0.12) (0.04) (0.11) (0.21) (0.13) (0.54)
INCOME3 0.50* 0.30*** 0.39* -0.01 0.09 1.15
(0.27) (0.06) (0.23) (0.28) (0.19) (0.77)
INCOME4 0.68* 0.48*** 0.56 0.00 0.17 1.77
(0.37) (0.09) (0.35) (0.43) (0.29) (1.16)
INCOME5 0.77* 0.67*** 0.81 -0.16 0.29 2.55
(0.44) (0.11) (0.52) (0.55) (0.39) (1.62)
INCOME6 0.85* 0.74*** 0.85 -0.17 0.40 2.55
(0.51) (0.12) (0.52) (0.60) (0.43) (1.64)
COMPULSORY SCHOOL (reference)
COLLEGE 0.31* 0.26*** 0.04 -0.07 0.19 0.74
(0.19) (0.05) (0.07) (0.29) (0.26) (0.60)
UNIVERSITY 0.09 0.36*** -0.04 -0.12 0.32* 0.24
(0.13) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.18) (0.40)
LNAGE -1.26*** 0.43*** -0.63*** -0.53 0.57 -5.80*
(0.25) (0.07) (0.17) (1.18) (0.72) (3.35)
EMP (reference)
INACTIVE -0.71* -0.12*** 0.10* 0.25 0.00 -0.97
(0.43) (0.03) (0.06) (0.58) (0.27) (0.73)
UNEMP 0.25*** 0.04 0.34*** 0.24* 0.00 0.64
(0.09) (0.04) (0.11) (0.13) (0.06) (0.43)
STUDENT 0.26* 0.30*** 0.61 -0.09 0.11 0.82
(0.14) (0.06) (0.38) (0.18) (0.13) (0.61)
COHABIT -0.07 0.12*** 0.03 -0.09 -0.03 -0.98*
(0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (0.25) (0.15) (0.52)
CONSTANT 3.33*** 0.16 1.37 4.84*** 0.74 12.11**
(1.20) (0.48) (1.31) (1.50) (0.88) (5.31)
IMR 2.35 0.56** 2.25 -0.37 -0.02 6.75
(1.55) (0.26) (1.65) (1.65) (1.14) (4.11)
Participation observations 67,601 67,601 67,601 67,601 67,601 67,601
Quantity observations 17,148 42,208 17,738 6117 9114 6061
Proportion drink/binge 25 % 62 % 26 % 9 % 13 % 9 %
Results are conditional on beer/wine/spirit drinking participation. Reference categories are income\10,000 sek, compulsory schooling,
employed, and living alone. Alcohol duty change is a dummy set to one after January 1st 2008 when there was a change in beer and wine excise
duties. Month dummies to capture resampling effects and seasonality and regional dummies are included in all models (reference categories:
Stockholm and January). Testing the null of no effect: *** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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Appendix 2
Missing data
The data for the years 2004 through to 2011 consists of a
total of 144,025 observations. The final sample size is
126,852 after accounting for missing data (see Table 18).
Linear regression analysis is used to assess potential
non-response bias (see Table 19). Missing values regarding
alcohol (this is a combined variable which records missing
if the respondent is missing data for whether they are a
drinker, whether they drank beer, wine or spirits or whether
they are a binge drinker) are predicted by younger
respondents, with lower income and who are male with all
Table 17 Alcohol log–log demand equation estimates conditional on participation, females (price indices results)
Variables Pure alcohol consumed by all drinkers Pure alcohol consumed by binge drinkers
Beer Wine Spirits Beer Wine Spirits
Linear time trend -0.06* -0.03*** -0.12* -0.00 -0.02 -0.17*
(0.04) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.10)
ln (beer price index) -0.50 -0.37
(0.64) (0.56)
ln (wine price index) -0.58 -0.90
(0.38) (1.74)
ln (spirit price index) -0.90 7.05
(1.04) (7.04)
See notes for Table 16. Results for income, education, employment status, and cohabiting are not shown but are included in the regression. The
excise duty rate change in January 2008 is not controlled for in these results
Table 18 Summary of missing
data by variable
Variable % Missing (%) N missing
DRINKER 0.70 1013
DRINK_BEER 2.99 4311
DRINK_WINE 3.01 4329
DRINK_SPIRIT 3.27 4709
BINGE DRINKER 2.77 3983
INCOME1 6.27 9035
COMPULSORY SCHOOL 0.00 1
LNAGE 0.00 1
MALE 0.00 1
COHABIT 0.02 32
EMP 2.12 3047
N 144,025
Source: Monitor project data years 2004–2011
Table 19 Regression analysis
results of missing data
Missing = 1 alc_missing INCOME_missing UNEMP_missing
INCOME2 -0.005** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
INCOME3 -0.003 -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
INCOME4 -0.011*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002)
INCOME5 -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.002)
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other variables seemingly unimportant (We define impor-
tant as both statistically significant at the 1 % level and a
coefficient effect size of at least 1 %). Of the explanatory
variables, our missing observation analysis finds that
interpretation of income correlations will be for a sub-
population that is possibly more educated, male, younger,
and more likely to be employed and employment status
correlations will be for a subpopulation that possibly has
higher income but lower levels of education.
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* p\ 0.1
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